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The orthodox interpretation of the Simonstown Agreements, concluded between Britain 
and Mutt Africa on 30 June 1955, is that the balance of advantage lay with 
Britain. According to this view, Britain certainly gave up the Royal Navy Base at 
Simonstown but on such terms that its "surrenderw was merely nominal: not only 
would Britain and its allies retain the right to use the Base in peace-time, but 
also in war - even if South Africa were to remain neutral. In effect, Britain would 
continue to have the unqualified use of the Base without the burden of maintaining 
it. South Africa was also to purchase naval capability worth E18m from British 
shipyards in order to enhance its contribution to the defence to the Cape Route. 
The Union would not subject the "coloured workers1f on the Base to the apartheid laws 
applying elsewhere in the Union. Finally, it would not, as it had sought, have 
British support for an African Defence Organisation (ADO) along SEATO lines. 
However, official British documents released over the last nine years reveal that 
this view needs substantial qualification. This paper will provide a summary of 
developments in Anglo-South African defence relations between 1949.and early 1955, 
and conclude with a detailed look at the final round of negotiations. 
High-level post-war defence talks between Britain and South Africa began 
in July 1949 and, except for a long break between the end of 1951 and August 1954, 
continued intermittently until the Simonstown Agreements were concluded. One 
important Nationalist ambition in these negotiations was to obtain modern weapons, 
which were in short supply at this time. Another, of course, was to secure the 
return of the Royal Naval Base at Simonstown. But most interesting was their desire 
to gain formal membership of the recently created Western alliance, preferably via a 
**regional defence ~rganisation~~ for Africa, composed of South Africa and the 
European colonial powers. In the absence of South African official documents, it is 
impossible to say with complete certainty what the National Party governmentts 
motives were for promoting this idea. Moreover, it seems that the importance 
attached to one or the other varied over the period. Nevertheless, on the basis of 
the British papers, it is evident that the following desires influenced South 
African policy: first, to commit the colonial powers to the racial status quo in 
Africa, in part by providing a vehicle for the northward advance of South African 
influence (firmly believed by the F0 as well as by the Colonial Office); secondly, 
to block Indian "infiltration" of the eastern seaboard of the continent and, more 
especially, to dramatize an '*Indianw as well as a mSovietlf threat for reasons of 
domestic politics; thirdly, to assist the Nationalist break with the British 
Commonwealth; and, fourthly, to provide reassurance to the white electorate that 
they would be safe from "native risings" in the event of South African forces being 
sent lroverseas" in another general war. 
As for Britain, it had one overriding goal in defence talks with the 
Union, to which it attached more and more importance as time wore on. This had 
nothing whatever to do with the "Cape Route". Instead, it was to secure a South 
African contribution to the defence of the Middle East, a region of vital interest 
to the United Kingdom. Preferably this would be obtained via the Union's membership 
of a "Middle East Defence Organization" (MEDO), but if necessary by some bilateral 
arrangement. 
The Nationalists, however, with their traditional hostility to fighting 
the wars of the British Empire, were extremely chary of a military commitment to the 
Middle East, while the British were for most of the time implacably opposed to a 
South African alliance via ADO. This scheme was believed by the Colonial Office to 
be a huge political liability as far as African opinion was concerned. It was 
regarded as strategically irrelevant by the Chiefs of Staff, who believed that the 
only threat to Africa, a Soviet one, lay in the Middle East, the "gateway to 
Africa". And it was, in any case, unanimously regarded in Whitehall as a practical 
impossibility since the American Congress would not entertain extension of the 
Western alliance to Africa, the French would see it as incompatible with their own 
schemes for the continent (though there was a change in this regard in early 1955), 
and the Portuguese would view it as a device for the extension of South African 
influence over their colonies. Production difficulties with, and competing demands 
- 
for, British weapons, together with a growing antipathy in Britain to the 
Afrikanerization of the English-dominated South African army and air force, with its 
accompanying drop in efficiency and morale, also made London periodically 
unenthusiastic about selling modern weapons to South Africa. As for the return of 
Simonstown, this was a subject on which Britain had mixed feelings. The Admiralty, 
which was on the defensive within Whitehall during this period, was happy to see the 
costs of the Base shouldered by the Union, provided the South Africans could 
maintain it properly and would allow the Royal Navy continued access in peace and 
war. But the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) initially believed that the 
political costs of surrendering the Base would be very high: the domestic position 
of the Nationalists relative to the pro-British United Party would be strengthened. 
Nevertheless,-Britain was so anxious for a South African military 
commitment to the Middle East and for good relations in general that it was prepared 
to go a very long way to meet the Union's ambitions. It would return Simonstown 
(with guarantees); it would re-equip South Africa's armed forces (availability of 
weapons permitting); and it would hold out to Pretoria the prospect of eventual 
full membership of the Western alliance by starting it out on the functional or 
llevolutionaryl' route to this goal, which, the Foreign Office informed the2South 
Africans, was the way in which the Atlantic Pact itself had been created. 
By September 1950 the South Africans had been sufficiently encouraged by 
the British (and discouraged by unrewarding feelers in Washington about arms) that 
they gave the commitment on the Middle East which London was so anxious to obtain. 
In the event of war and on the assumption that the Union's armed forces could obtain 
the necessary equipment, South Africa undertook to contribute to the defence of 
Africa, Itin the Middle East if required", one armoured division, one fighter group 
of nine squadrons, personnel for one air transport squadron, and such naval forces 
as could be spared from their primars task of protecting South African waters. 
Staff talks were also to take place. However, although this commitment was 
described as "firm and specific" in London and seems to have been known to the South 
African public, at least in general terms, it did not quite amount to an alliance. 
This is not mainly because its details have remained secret until now, although as 
far as we are aware they have, but because it was embodied only in agreed minutes 
even though a formal exchange of; letters had been planned at the end of the 
negotiations in September 1950. Though the evidence is not entirely unambiguous on 
this, it seems almost certain that this exchange did not take place, probably 
because it would have expressed an intention to create legal rights and obligations 
and required its registration with the United Nations as a "Treatyf1; in any event, 
it was I&, in contrast to subsequent defence agreements with Britain, registered 
with the UN. Unquestionably, the South Africans had no intention of making this 
11commitment18 as firm as all that! 
In return for this inconspicuous and obviously reluctant South African 
commitment to the Middle East, Britain confirmed that the equipment necessary for an 
expeditionary force would be forthcoming, and promised to co-sponsor with the Union 
an exploratory, strictly ad referendum conference on defence facilities (mainly 
transport) in Africa in order to give the Nationalists some multilateral "coverw and 
thus ease any problems with their anti-British followers. This conference, the 
African Defence Facilities Conference, was subsequently held in Nairobi in August 
1951, but provided the Union with only the most feeble beginning on its 
flevolutionaryll road to full membership of the Western alliance: Britain was able to 
stand back and contentedly observe the rejection of South Africa's c umsy demands i! for some "continuing organizationl' by the French and the Portuguese. The 
Portuguese did not even ratify the Nairobi Report itself until early 1954! 
In the period between the end of 1951 and the end of 1954 three 
developments outside South Africa caused the momentum which had begun to develop in 
the construction of Anglo-South African entente to be lost. The first of these was 
the return as Prime Minister of Britain in October 1951 of Winston Churchill, who 
firmly squashed all attempts to persuade him to abandon Simonstown - attempts made 
in March 1952 by the CRO, which had had a change of heart on this, p d  now wanted to 
give up Simonstown without an unqualified user guarantee for the RN ; by the 
Admiralty in 1953 as an economy measure during the first I1Radical Review; ("it would 
be more reasonable to shut down Ports~louth~~, minuted Churchill ominously ; and by a 
united front of CRO, Admiralty and Defence in August 1954, even though the South 
African Defence Minister, F C Erasmus, was now offering an unqualified user 
guarantee on the Base, for by this time it was a foregone cof3clusion that in the 
next war Britain and South Africa would be on the same side. (However, Churchill 
reluctantly agreed in September 1954 to the establishment of a Joint Working Party 
to study the practicalities of transfer.) The second development was the scaling 
down of Britain's own rearmament programme, which provided the South Africans with 
an excuse to slow down the modernization of their own forces, with the result that, 
against a background of squabbles over payment and delivery, they never equipped or 
raised the men for anything like the expeditionary force outlined in the commitment 
of September 1950. And the third was the failure of MEDO to get off the ground, 
which enabled the South Africans to claim in the course of 1954 that the commitment 
itself had lapsed anyway, even though in all of the British papers on the 1950 
negotiations there is not even a single reference to MEDO, let alone any suggestion 
that the Union's commitment was conditional on its creation. 
If the effect of these developments on the Anglo-South African entente 
between early 1952 and late 1954 was to push it towards a state of irritable limbo, 
there was one development which had a revivifying effect. This was the Frencln- 
inspired Conference on West African Defence Facilities held at Dakar in March 1954, 
which the F0 initially tried to strangle at birth but eventually felt obliged to 
concede to the Quai d'0rsay as quid pro quo for its support of Nairobi and as a 
gesture of Anglo-French colonial solidarity. (Thus had Britain, by agreeing for 
political reasons to one strategically useless "defence facilitiesu conference, 
landed itself with another.) On the insistence of the CRO (whose case was frankly 
political) and the Chiefs of Staff (whose case was strategic but incoherent), South 
Africa was invited to attend, though its locus standi was doubtful to the point of 
being a complete mystery, and for this reason (amongst others) its exclusion from 
Dakar was the original inclination of the F0 and the enduring desire of the Colonial 
Office. 
Dakar was significant for the surreptitious integration of South Afkica 
into the Western alliance because it rescued the agreements "in principlev9 which had 
been achieved at Nairobi (mainly on transit and communications arrangements in East 
Africa in war) and led to the setting up at the end of 1954 of working parties to 
follow up both conferences. An Anglo-French group was established for Dakar in 
Paris and an Anglo-South African group for Nairobi in Pretoria Because of Foreign 
Office fears of the effect on Portugal and Belgium of ghe emergence of a !*Big Three 
in African Defence", these remained completely secret. In early 1955 the French 
suggested - whether with or without Union prompting is not clear - that the South 
Africans ~bould join the Paris Working Party while they should join the one in 
Pretoria. This was stonewalled by the F0 but it was clear that the South Africans 
were still taking its suggested t*evolutionaryll approach to ADO very seriously - and 
so, it seemed now, were the French. This came to a head, together with other 
things, when Erasmus returned to London for defence talks in the middle of 1955. 
London was aware that the return of Simonstown was going to be the focus 
of these negotiations for the South Africans. Finding himself in a weakened 
position in the new Cabinet of J G trijdom, Erasmus badly needed the fillip to his 
prestige which this would provide.'' As a result, much of the discussion in London 
preparatory to the negotiations centred on whether or not handing over the 
Simonstown Base should be "linked" to a fresh Union commitment to the defence of the 
Middle East. Such a commitment, said the Chiefs of Staff, was now of more 
importance than ever in view of the shortage of land and air forces to hold the 
anticipated Russian advance along the line of the Zagros Mountains, and would need 
to provide for "a contribution by South Africa to arrive within at most a few day8 
of D-day", in contrast to the leisurely programme written into the 1950 agreement. 
The South Africans would also need to undertake a major re-equipment and traini 
programme, which should include peace-time exercises in the Middle East itself. ?@ 
The Admiralty, however, was strongly opposed to the linkage proposal, 
holding that Britain was never likely to get better terms from the South Africans on 
Simonstown than were presently on offer, and that this was more important than any 
forces which the Union might provide for the Middle East. Moreover, if linked to 
the Middle East commitment, the crystallizing agreement on the Base was likely to be 
lost, since it was considered highly unlikely that Erasmus could make this 
commitment firm enough, timely enough, or substantial enough to satisfy the Chiefs 
of Staff. Nevertheless, outside the Admiralty there was strong support for the 
linkage proposal, and at the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 3 June it was agreed that 
this should initially be put to the South Africans but that if they refused to go 
along it should be abandoned and a separate agreement made on Simonstown. However, 
in this event Erasmus would also forfeit the small degree of unostentatious progress 
in the direction of ADO which Britain was now prepared to contemplate, the more 
especially since it was seen as a means of blocking a rival suggestion of Eric 
Louw's fpg a white man's Pan-African Conference to provide a counter-blast to 
Bandung. 
At the meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 10 June, chaired by 
Eden, the Admiralty's tactical compromise was diluted somewhat by the Prime Minister 
but held basically intact. Thus, said the Prime Minister, It... our first aim should 
be to obtain a satisfactory agreement on the future of the naval base at Simonstown 
... Our second aim should be to obtain some assurance of South African participation 
in the defence of the ~iddle East, though this should not at this stage be pressed 
to the point of jeopardising our chances of obtaining a satisfactory agreement on 
Simonstown. On the third ~ubject~~, he concluded, "we should decline to enter into 
an African Defence Organization but should explore the possibility of holding 
further conferences on communications and logistics in Africa, in continuation of 
those already held .l1 
Key files bearing on the June negotiations are being withheld, so it is 
not possible to be certain of the sequence of events. Nor is it entirely clear if 
Simonstown was explicitly and forcefullx linked to a South African Middle East 
commitment. What is certain is that a formula on ItMiddle East Defencew was devised 
in the first few days of the negotiations by the British side, in which the Union 
would make such a commitment in return for the joint sponsoring of "further 
conferences on logistics and communications designed to forward and develop the 
planning already begun at the Nairobi and Dakar Conferences ... (which) ... might 
lead to the establishment of some permanent secretariat or Joint Planning Staff 
whose purpose would be to make plans to ensr$e the technical adequacy and efficiency 
of the routes from the Union to the North". And what seems almost certain is feat 
this offer was made against the background of an implicit linkage to Simonstown. 
However, as feared by the Admiralty, Erasmus was prepared to offer vague assurances, 
together with consultations between Chiefs of Staff, but not to give the sort of 
firm and specific commitment which the Chiefs of Staff wanted. Such a commitment, 
said Erasmus, must be conditional on the creation of a Middle East Defence 
Organisation, or at the very least upon the holding of a conference to discuss 
Middle East defenc which would be attended by all interested powers but especially 
the United States.'. As a result, the British formula was discarded. 
On 23 June Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's new Minister of Defence, told the 
Cabinet that the choice was between either  concluding an agreement on Simonstown 
and on naval co-operation, together with a promise of military staff talks on the 
Middle East", which was his personal preference, or, Itin default of a firm South 
African promise to co-operate in the defence of the Middle East", breaking off "the 
whole of the discussionsfr. Anthony Eden immediately endorsed his Defence Minister's 
line, observing in its support that he "would not put too high a value on a South 
African undertaking to contribute towards the defence of the Middle East. In the 
event", he continued, "the decision whether or not South African troops should be 
sent to the Middle East in war would be taken by the Union Government of the day in 
the light of the circumstances then prevailing. Secret staff talks, to which 
Mr Erasmus might be persuaded to assent", he concluded, llwauld give us sllmmat as 
much assurance of eventual South African support in this areaasany formal 
commitment by the present Government of the Union." Indeed, the Prime Minister 
appeared more exercised by the inadequate safeguards offered by Erasmus for the 
future recruitment of llcoloured workersv1 into the Simonstown Dockyard. As a result, 
the Cabinet decided that the British side should "press strongly" for further 
safeguards.for them and that, subject to satisfaction on this point, "it should 
continue to be a primary objective in these discussions to obtain a satisfactory 
agreement on the transfer of the naval base at Simonstown and on naval cooperation 
generally, and that attainment of that objective should not be prejudiced by 
insistence on a firm South African promise of co-operation in the defence of the 
Middle East". 
Following this Cabinet, the negotiations were resumed, and by 25 June the 
British side felt that it had got as much out of the South Africans as possible. 
The main developments were that the South Africans had met the British on the 
coloured workers, and the two sides had split the difference between them concerning 
the date of transfer of Simonstown. The Union had also agreed to take part in staff 
talks relating to its participation in the defence of the Middle East, which, said a 
memorandum covering the draft agreements, "goes a good deal further than anything 
which Mr Erasmus has previously been prepared to acceptv1 (this was untrue). In the 
light of these South African concessions, the Defence Minister, the Commonwealth 
Secretary, and the First Lord of the Admiralty invited the Cabinet to endorse the 
draft agreements which they had produced. Formally, these provided for the transfer 
of Simonstown to Union sovereignty in return for an unqualified user guarantee for 
the Royal Navy (and, in war, for allied navies as well), the promise of an increased 
Union contribution to the defence of the Cape route by a South African Navy 
substantially enlarged through Q18m worth of purchases from British shipyards, and 
South African agreement to place this navy under the command of the Royal Navy 
C-in-C South Atlantic in war (though this was now only implicit, as was subsequently 
pointed out in Cabinet on 28 June). The draft agreements also announced that 
Britain would I1contribute forces for the defence of Africa, including Southern 
Africa, and the Middle East", and its acceptance in principle of the need for a 
limited African Defence Organization and an undertaking to help the Union establish 
it, together with a spiritually related provision whereby other governments might be 
invited to join the new Anglo-South African naval command structure. In return, 
they also provided for South Africa's commitment in principle to the "defence of 
Southern Africa, Africa and the Middle East gateways to Africa", and staff talks to 
give this substance. These drafts were to take the form of exchanges of 
correspondence between Selwyn Lloyd and Erasmus and, while the first three would be 
published, the fourth, on staff talks, would, on the insistence of Eraamus, refa~in 
secret. 
The Fogs African department took great exception to the drafts on regional 
defence and staff talks, and with good reason. Following powerful indictments frorn 
Caryl Ramsden and T E Bromley (Head of Department), on 27 June Evelyn Shuckburgh 
(Superintending Assistant Under-Secretary) minuted: 
I adhere to the view which I expressed to Lord 
Reading on June 23 - namely that Documents C and D 
(Middle East/African defence, and staff talks on the 
Middle East) are of practically no value to us and 
'contain dangerous commitments for us. The only thing 
we get out of the transaction is the agreement of the 
S.Africans to have staff talks with us on 'matters 
relating to S. AW+imm participation' in M,E.Defence, 
without colswitatent. In return we undertake to sponsor 
a conference which we do not want which will 
colnplicate our relations with the French, Portuguese 
etc, and we declare our intention to contribute forces 
to the defence of Southern Africa and Africa although 
I can't believe we have any such intention. We also 
implicitly commit ourselves to tell the South AFricans 
all about our M.E.defence plans at any stage from now 
on, although they are in no way committed to help us 
over them. 
I do not think the game is worth the candle, and I 
would prefer to let Mr Erasmus go home and meditate 
for another 6 or 12 months on the problem of stopping 
Russian armies any where south or west of the Zagros 
Mountains. 
This was capped with alpll endorsement from the Permanent Under Secretary himself, 
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. 
When the drafts came before the full Cabinet on 28 June, the naval 
agreements provoked no serious debate but Lord Reading attempted to take issue with 
the other two. Unfortunately for the FO, he hardly gave a full account of its view, 
choosing to dwell only on the argument that it might be possible to extract a "firm 
promise*' of South African help in the Middle East if and when the United States had 
made I1a definite military commitment" to the region. Against this was presented the 
view that llpostponement might jeopardise the prospect of making effective progress 
through Staff conversations1'. The opinion of the Chiefs of Staff (now echoing Eden) 
"that these conversations might offer an opportunity for a more practical approach 
to this problemn1 was also reported, and the possibility was thrown in "that closer 
contact between the military staffs might pave the way for a further effort to 
overcome the political difficulties which now stood in the way of a firm South 
African promise to co-operate in the defence of the Middle East". On these 
arguments, which in the light of the known strategic as well as political prejudices 
of Erasmus and his service chiefs were optimistic, to say the least, Reading was 
defeated and, with only insignificant amendments, the Cabinet authorised a 
settlement with Erasmus on the basis of the four draft agreement. 
The real deal between Britain and South Africa over Simonstown was, of 
course, quite different from that presented to the public. In the first place, the 
promise of unqualified user privileges at the Base about which the British 
government made so much was not a major South African concession, because both sides 
had come to accept that in the Cold War CO-belligerency was implicit in their 
relationship. In the second place, neither was South Africa's naval expansion 
programme a major concession by the Union, though less because it was needed in 
Pretorials own interest than because few people in Westminster, fewer still in 
Whitehall, and none at all in Portsmouth seriously believed that the South Africans 
had either the will or the personnel to carry it all though - as subsequently proved 
to be the case. 
In reality, Simonstown was returned to the South Africans because the 
Admiralty knew that it was in practice worth little in the absence of Union goodwill 
and because it wanted to spend its limited resources on more important things. It 
was also returned because the symbolic cost to the Empire and to the relative 
political strength of English-speakers in the Union which the sacrifice of 
sovereignty over the Base would entail, and which in the end Churchill alone had not 
been prepared to incur, was now believed to be less important. Outweighing it was 
the wish to avoid, for the sake of Britain's other interests in the Union, "putting 
a needless strain on friendship (with South Africa) in the futurew, as The Times, a 
lone voice in q~estionin9~the official and public justification for the Simonstown 
Agreements, pointed out. This also explains why the entente between Britain and 
South African was strengthened more in the direction favoured by Pretoria than that 
favoured by London. These other feterests - as earlier documented in Economic Power 
and Anglo-South African Diplomacy - included Britain's economic stake in the 
Union, especially in gold and uranium, and it is clear from the record that the two 
Commonwealth Secretaries who did most to shape the parameters of the Simonstown 
Agreements - Patrick Gordon Walker and Lord Swinton - were sensitive to this point. 
The broader picture also included the future of British-controlled Bechuanaland, 
Basutoland, and Swaziland: Swinton feared that his refusal to surrender them would 
lead to a deterioration in relations with Pretoria. And it had also lately come to 
include a desire to prevent South African opposition to the inclusion of independent 
black states in the Commonwealth. 
It is now apparent, however, Eden's sour grapes and Admiralty reservations 
notwithstanding, that  the British interest  "inV' South Africa which had carried 
London furthest towards a settlement with Pretoria over Simonstown was its 
continuing hope for  the creation of an effective fighting force i n  the Union firmly 
committed t o  the defence of the Middle East. It is also now apparent tha t  the 
fai lure  to  make much ground with th i s  had, despite the superficial  cleverness of 
Eden's argument i n  Cabinet, been the great disappointment t o  Britain of these 
negotiations, though it had not been a great surprise. This, as  well as the 
slenderness of South Africa's formal concessions (perhaps its biggest was excepting 
"coloured workersw from apartheid laws a t  the Naval Base), gives l i e  t o  the orthodox 
view, cleverly inspired by the British government, that  even i n  its formal terms the 
Simonstown Agreements were very favourable t o  Britain. 
The authors gra te f i l ly  acknowledge the assistance towards the research on which this 
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